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I.

ARGUMENT

To aid in resolution of this matter, Mr. Vigos will respond to MFG Financial's brief
utilizing the same formatting of the arguments so that the Court can make direct
comparisons. Mr. Vigos does not agree, though, that these arguments as presented are
necessary to consider for the Court to make a decision; the arguments Mr. Vigos
presented in his opening brief reflect his view of what this Court should find relevant.

A. Vigos did not admit the operative terms of the contract.
MFG argues at length in its brief that by judicial admission by statements made in
summary judgment briefing that Mr. Vigos had admitted the operative terms of the
contract. Both the magistrate and district courts rightfully rejected that argument. Only
statements made in pleadings can be judicial admissions. Charnry v. Charnry, 159 Idaho
62, 68 n. 2, 356 P.3d 355, 361 n. 2 (2015) "The pleadings are a complaint, an answer, a
reply to a counterclaim, an answer to a cross-claim, and an answer to a third party
complaint." Id.
The fact MFG is fighting so hard to get the contract into evidence as a judicial
admission shows the difficulty it has making the document admissible without an
admission. While MFG argues that a contract is not hearsay for various reasons, there
still must be some foundation for it to be admissible. No such foundation was presented
to the magistrate, which is why it was not admitted into evidence.
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B. MFG has not proven it has standing to enforce the contract.
It is a basic premise of law that a party must have the legal right to enforce a
contract before it can do so. MFG argues the chain of title in this case is straightforward
and clear, but only if the court takes leaps of logic and massive inferences, while
ignoring the actual admissible evidence.
Summary judgment is a proper procedural method for dismissing a claim based
on a lack of standing. Thomson v. City of Lewiston, 137 Idaho 473, 476, 50 P.3d 488, 491
(2002).
The magistrate court found that MFG had failed to prove it was the real party in
interest with admissible evidence.
MFG cites several cases for the proposition that it can wait until trial to present
admissible evidence. That misconstrues the holding of the cited cases. For example, Gem
State Ins. Co. v. Hutchison states: "When considering evidence presented in support of or

opposition to a motion for summary judgment, a court can only consider material which
would be admissible at trial." 145 Idaho 10, 14, 175 P.3d 172, 176 (2007). MFG reads
that as saying that as long as it is admissible by the time the case gets to trial, it does not
have to be admissible in support of or in opposition to a motion for summary judgment.
That reading is incorrect. What courts mean by the requirement that the evidence must
be admissible at trial is that at the summary judgment stage the court must use the same
evidentiary standards that it will use at trial.
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Directly following the statement above in Gem State Ins. Co., the Court says:
"Thus, if the admissibility of evidence presented in support of a motion for summary
judgment is raised by objection by one of the parties, the court must first make a
threshold determination as to the admissibility of the evidence 'before proceeding to the
ultimate issue, whether summary judgment is appropriate.' "
MFG's contention that it could have gotten the contract into evidence at trial is
more appropriately addressed by Tri-State Nat'/ Bank v. Western GatewtfY Storage Co.: "Mere
denials, assertions of what 'might have [been],' of what one has 'been told' or 'advised,'
of matters not stated from personal knowledge, of numerous legal conclusions
(especially by laymen), and of what one hopes 'will be shown at trial' are not enough to
create a 'genuine issue'" under IRCP 56(e). 92 Idaho 543, 447 P.2d 409 (1968).
The only case MFG cites to support the notion that it could wait until trial to
present its evidence in admissible form is from the Ninth Circuit. No Idaho case law
could be found, because that is not the law in Idaho.
The facts of this case, in regards to the standing issue, mirror those of a case
recently decided by this Court, Porifolio Recovery Assocs., LLC. v. MacDonald, 2017 WL
2376426 (Idaho June 1, 2017). In that case, in dicta, the Court addressed a Defendant's
burden of proof when moving for summary judgment. The Court stated:
MacDonald's burden in support of his motion for summary judgment could 'be
satisfied by showing the absence of material fact with regard to' PRA's claim to
be the assignee of MacDonald's obligation. If the materials that MacDonald
submitted in support of his motion for summary judgment satisfied this threshold
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burden, then the burden shifted to PRA to demonstrate by way of admissible
evidence that a genuine issue of material fact exists as to this issue.
MacDonald failed to meet this initial burden. Consequently, PRA was not
required to present admissible evidence to resist MacDonald's motion for
summary judgment. MacDonald could have shown the absence of evidence of an
assignment "either by an affirmative showing with [his] own evidence or by a
review of all [PRA's] evidence and the contention that such proof of an element
is lacking." Id. at 6.
The Court explained that because the Defendant had merely presented an
affidavit providing the documents Plaintiff had produced in discovery, without
specifying that it was all the documents produced in discovery, that it had failed to shift
the burden of proof to Plaintiff.
Likewise, in this case, Mr. Vigos' counsel filed an affidavit stating that it was
attaching evidence produced by MFG in discovery. The affidavit did not specify that it
was all the evidence produced in discovery which would support MFG's claims, yet the
magistrate court was able to correctly infer that it must be all the relevant evidence
based on the fact MFG did not object or claim that Mr. Vigos had misled the court by
not presenting all the evidence produced in discovery.

In a case cited in MacDonald, the court discussed how a defendant could win on
summary judgment:
Because Holdaway would bear the burden of proof as to causation at trial,
Broulim's could carry its initial burden as the movant on summary judgment by
establishing "the absence of sufficient evidence" that the door at Broulim's
fractured the screw. "Such an absence of evidence may be established either by
an affirmative showing with the moving party's own evidence or by a review of all
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the nonmoving party's evidence and the contention that such proof of an element
is lacking." Broulim's satisfied its initial burden by doing two things.
First, it submitted Holdaway's medical records and demonstrated that they
do not support the allegation that the door at Broulim's caused the screw in
Holdaway's leg to fracture. Second, it successfully moved to strike the only
statements in the record addressed to causation.

Holdawqy v. Broulim's Supermarket, 158 Idaho 606, 611, 349 P .3d 1197, 1202 (2015),
reh'g denied (June 22, 2015).(internal citations omitted).
What that case does not say, or any similar cases describing what a defendant
must prove when moving for summary judgment, is that the defendant must
affirmatively state in an affidavit that it is presenting the court with all possible evidence
to support the plaintiffs claims and that it finds the evidence to be lacking. Rather, the
cases say a review of the evidence must show that an element of the cause of action
cannot be met. It is unnecessary hairsplitting to require the defendant to say it has
presented all the evidence plaintiff has produced in discovery, when the plaintiff has
made no claim that the evidence defendant has presented is anything other than all the
evidence it has to support its cause of action.
Mr. Vigos established to the satisfaction of the magistrate court that MFG did
not have adequate admissible evidence to prove it is the real party in interest and the
district court erred in reversing that ruling.

C. The magistrate was correct in awarding attorney fees and costs to Vigos.
The district court did not address this issue because Mr. Vigos was no longer the
prevailing party at the magistrate level after the decision granting him summary
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judgment was reversed. However, should this court reverse the district court's decision,
Mr. Vigos provided an adequate basis for the magistrate court to award attorney fees
and costs.
MFG claims that Mr. Vigos' failure to list the statutory basis for fees in his
memorandum of fees and costs prevents him from recovery. Mr. Vigos identified the
appropriate legal basis for his request for attorney fees under the "prayer for relief'
section of his "Answer to Complaint." Vigos requested: "3. Defendant be awarded his
attorney's and costs of court of this action under LC.§§ 12-120(1), 12-120(3), 12-121,
and l.R.C.P 54, and such other further relief the court deems just and proper."
Oakes v. Boise Heart Clinic P~sicians, PLLC, has facts on point with our case. The

court found that where the party requesting attorney fees had not listed a basis for
attorney fees in his actual memorandum in support of costs, the party had effectively
put the opposing party on notice of the basis for attorney fees by stating said basis in his
complaint. 152 Idaho 540, 544, 272 P.3d 513,517 (2012).
Attorney fees are plainly available to the prevailing party under Idaho Code§ 12120(1) because the amount sought by the Plaintiff was less than $35,000.

D. MFG's motion to continue is irrelevant to this appeal.
The Court need not even consider MFG's argument that the magistrate court
erred in denying its motion to continue. MFG made its motion on the basis that it
wanted to do a deposition of Mr. Vigos to determine if he had made payments which
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would bring the claim back within the applicable statute of limitations. The magistrate
court bifurcated the issues and determined it did not need to make a determination on
the statute of limitations argument because MFG had failed to prove the contract was
enforceable and that it had standing to do so. Therefore, MFG was not prejudiced by
the denial of the motion to continue and that denial has no bearing on the outcome of
this appeal.
E. The district court erred in determining the prevailing party.
Mr. Vigos agrees that MFG did not file a cross-appeal to the district court on the
denial of its motion for summary judgment. Therefore, it should have been the
prevailing party on the appeal to the district court. However, it would only be eligible
for an award of attorney fees and costs if it ends up being the prevailing party for the
entire case. See, e.g., Portfolio Recovery Assocs., LLC. v. MacDonald, 2017 WL 2376426
(Idaho June 1, 2017).

II.

CONCLUSION

Based on the argument above, Appellant requests this Court reverse the ruling of
the district court denying Mr. Vigos' motion for summary judgment.
DATED this 16th day of June, 2017.

Attorney for Appellant
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